The U.S.–Iran negotiations are nothing but a sham, and before the midterm elections Trump will absolutely not withdraw troops

 

The brief so‑called negotiation period between the U.S. and Iran is about to end. During this time, Trump applied for $200 billion in military funding, with troops and equipment already deployed. What the media described as Trump “TACO” does not exist. The negotiation terms exchanged by the two countries are nothing but pipe dreams. The next step for the U.S. military—occupying Kharg Island—is inevitable. Once the island is controlled, it is equivalent to controlling Iran’s oil exports and part of the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. military has already bombed the island’s ground facilities, and naturally the next move is ground forces engaging in an island seizure operation.

Some EU countries are participating in escort missions, and Gulf states joining the fight is already on the agenda, though more time is needed. Even if the U.S. and Israel wanted a ceasefire now, Gulf states—under security threats—would still need to intensify strikes against Iran. A military alliance for sustained attacks on Iran has already formed, and the war is showing signs of becoming prolonged, lasting months or even longer depending on circumstances. Israel, despite its absolute advantage, has struggled with Hamas for a long time; how much more difficult it would be against Iran, one of the stronger powers in the Middle East. Trump’s conditions for a ceasefire are clear: Iran must hand over enriched uranium, establish a pro‑U.S. government, allow free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, stop all military resistance, let the U.S. dominate oil and gas control, and refrain from launching special operations against neighboring countries. As long as Iran refuses, there will be no ceasefire—especially since the U.S. and Israel currently hold absolute military superiority.

Iran’s ability to resist relies on the complete military system built for it over decades by China and Russia. Its vast underground facilities give it the capacity to withstand two to three rounds of U.S.‑Israeli strikes. Earlier, street protests in Iran were suppressed, key figures and uprising leaders eliminated, and the government had essentially stabilized the domestic situation before U.S. attacks began. Unless Iran’s military and irregular forces are completely destroyed, it is impossible for the public to launch a larger uprising in coordination with military strikes. Kurdish guerrillas are negligible. Iran still possesses considerable unconventional warfare capabilities, able to attack neighboring countries’ energy and civilian infrastructure in ways that are hard to defend against. The U.S. has no ability to provide total protection.

Eliminating Iran’s military resistance is the only solution, which requires ground forces to intervene for actual occupation and target clearance. Entering Kharg Island is not too difficult for U.S. forces; the challenge lies in eliminating remaining defenders and securing the island effectively. The island has numerous underground facilities, and fighting in areas dense with energy infrastructure while avoiding large‑scale destruction poses certain difficulties. But if Kharg Island is successfully taken and controlled, Iran’s bargaining power will be greatly weakened. The war now depends on how long Iran’s stored war energy can last. The U.S. will not withdraw at least before the midterm elections, and Gulf states hope to resolve the Iran issue completely.

However, if the war drags on, Trump may at any time fabricate a reason and suddenly withdraw troops without warning, shifting the burden of striking Iran onto Israel. Only then would Iran have a glimmer of survival.