2026年5月22日 星期五
Trump Leaves, Putin Rushes In — But No Pecking Duck This Time
U.S. President Donald Trump has just concluded his visit to
Beijing. Aside from a few words on the Iran issue and some vague promises, he
gained nothing substantial. The meals in Beijing were good, and he did some
sightseeing; his wife wore a qipao that highlighted her figure. As for the
trade tariff war, the United States has in fact already lost. China’s rare
earth strategy means America’s military industry, automobile sector, and
semiconductors would grind to a halt. Even though Trump brought Jensen Huang
along at the last minute to agree to chip sales, Beijing indirectly rejected
the offer.
Trump can identify America’s problems but lacks the ability to solve them. His so‑called “maximum pressure” approach is not a successful method in business, only occasionally effective in specific circumstances. His flaw is not relying on a strong think tank with plans, priorities, and efficiency, but instead acting on personal will, issuing impulsive and erratic orders. His political wisdom is childlike: he does not understand compromise, retreat, or strategic patience.
His “Twitter governance” produced endless, unreliable promises, creating confusion everywhere, and ultimately collapsing due to flawed measures. Pressure on China may be necessary, but the methods and strategy must be cautious. U.S.–China cooperation has been a basic national policy since the Cold War, respected by successive governments. Now, by cutting ties through tariffs and trade wars, America faces consequences it cannot absorb in the short term, while China
benefits by holding firm.
Containing China requires leveraging America’s international influence, uniting global powers, and applying long‑term pressure over decades while building alternatives. In reality, however, America has simultaneously pressured other countries, creating a situation of overreach and misalignment, turning itself into the adversary. The tariff war is effectively over, and the chip blockade has failed. On Iran, America is stuck; on Russia, the issue has become secondary. Trump must find new strategies for the midterm elections.
As soon as Trump left, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Beijing. As in his past visits, he stayed less than a day. Before the war in Ukraine, Putin outwardly cooperated with China but inwardly disliked it. He is a major player in international politics and has no affection for a regional power built by Soviet support. The relationship has always been one of mutual use, with Russia dominant: China buys energy at set prices and pays up. Chinese leaders may flatter endlessly, but Putin remains unmoved. The relationship has never been equal. In energy, food, weapons, geopolitics, and nuclear power, Russia holds absolute strength.
But the war reshuffled everything. Russia has exhausted the Soviet inheritance, a 48‑hour war dragging into four years, with heavy casualties, a passive battlefield, economic collapse, fiscal drain, and international isolation. Putin cannot stay abroad for long without risking domestic instability. This “emergency state visit” drew global attention.
Though they proclaimed “friendship without limits,” signed dozens of agreements, and issued a 47‑page joint statement on “a multipolar world” and “strategic coordination,” Russia’s core need was the “Power of Siberia 2” gas pipeline. Yet no binding contract was signed, no timetable announced, and the project was absent from the Kremlin’s official results list. The Kremlin spokesman awkwardly said only that “general consensus” and “shared understanding” were reached.
Chinese leaders told Trump, “Perhaps Putin already regrets starting the war.” Since the war began, the balance in Sino‑Russian relations has reversed. Russia has severed ties with the West, binding itself to China in politics, economy, military, diplomacy, technology, and daily life. Without Chinese support, Russia could not last a month. For Putin, continuing the war is the only way to stay in power; stopping would mean defeat and surrender.
In Russian history, external expansion, however costly, is accepted if it benefits the empire, making leaders heroes. Failure, however, means being condemned as criminals. Ending the war, even withdrawing from eastern Ukraine, would mean defeat. How to resettle and stabilize a million defeated troops returning home? Turning guns inward would destabilize the country.
Putin’s visit was driven by fear that Beijing might secretly strike a deal with Trump, betraying Russia. The Cold War ended largely due to U.S.–China cooperation. Thus Putin sought assurances. “Power of Siberia 2” is the test case. Russia lacks the funds to build it, relying entirely on China, but Beijing refuses to budge on price, financing, and supply security. Putin fears China may tilt toward the U.S. on Iran, Ukraine, and global energy, worsening Russia’s strategic position. China, meanwhile, uses Putin’s visit to project an image of controlling both Washington and Moscow.
Today, in Sino‑Russian relations, China calls the shots; Russia is not even a follower. The “no limits” partnership, support for Russia’s invasion, and pre‑war multi‑billion energy deals all lured Russia into a war of attrition, diverting Western pressure away from China. Whether intentional or not, the outcome is irreversible. Now China holds both U.S. and Russian cards, plus Iran as a bargaining chip, able to manipulate the global stage.
“川菜”特朗普剛走普總匆忙又來但北京烤鴨就不吃了
美國總統特朗普剛結束訪北京行程，除了聊幾句伊朗問題外，得到幾句不痛不癢的所謂承諾，其餘一無所獲。不過在北京的伙食不錯，順道還旅遊了一下，老婆穿了旗袍更顯身材。至於貿易關稅戰美國實際上已經戰敗，對方稀土戰略一出美國軍工，汽車和半導體都得停工，即便是出訪前臨時飛機繞道帶上黃仁勛，硬著頭破同意向中方出售晶片，然而對方卻間接拒絕了。
特朗普能夠發現美國的問題，但是缺乏解決的能力，所謂極限施壓即便在商業上也不是一個成功的方法，在特定的環境下偶然有作用。他的問題在於不依靠強大的智囊團，有計劃，有目的，有效率，有主次，常態化，戰略性地解決問題，而是憑藉個人意志，經常做出任性不著邊際的指令，他的政治智慧接近兒童，不懂妥協讓步以退爲進，推特治國的結果是無休止的毫無信用可言的承諾，給各方造成難以理解的巨大混亂後，因措施本身的錯漏只能最後不了了之。對中國的打壓無論從任何方面來説都有必要，但是採取的手段和戰略的運用必須慎之又慎，中美合作是美國冷戰後的基本國策被各界政府所遵從，現在通過關稅貿易戰搞極限切割，導致的後果美國無法在中短期內消化，相反使得對方通過保持強硬立場變相受益。
圍堵打壓中國需要利用美國的國際影響力聯合國際力量，進行長期施壓逐步蠶食，過程需要數十年並且需要與此同時建立替代者。而現實是美國與中國發生衝突的同時，對其他國家的打壓力度更大，最後造成了顧此失彼的局面，美國反而成了對立面。現在貿易關稅戰實際上已經結束，晶片高科技的封鎖也已失效。伊朗問題美國進退兩難，俄羅斯問題成爲次要矛盾，特朗普必須為中期選舉另謀他策。
特朗普一走俄羅斯總統普京立馬訪問北京，正如他多次到訪時形成的傳統，逗留時間極短不到一天就離開。俄烏戰爭開打之前，普京對中國表面合作內心厭惡，他是國際政治的主要玩家，不會對中國這個地域強權，當年蘇聯扶植建立的政權有任何的好感，雙方的關係就是互相利用，俄羅斯佔絕對主導地位，俄羅斯站臺中國按指定價格購買能源出錢。領導人雖然無限諂媚，作爲普京來講不爲所動，雙方的關係從來就是不平等的。能源，糧食，武器，地緣政治，核武等，普京擁有絕對實力。
但是戰爭開打重新洗牌，俄羅斯冷戰結束蘇聯解體後繼承的所有財產耗盡，48小時的戰爭打了4年，軍事上傷亡慘重，戰局變得極度被動，經濟崩塌財政消耗，在國際上被孤立制裁，普京現在多留一天都會引發內政不穩。這場被外界高度關注的「緊急國事訪問」，雖然表面高喊「友誼無上限」，簽署數十項合作檔，並發表長達47頁聯合聲明，大談「多極世界」與「戰略協作」，但俄羅斯最急需的核心成果是「西伯利亞力量2號」天然氣管道項目，但期待的回復仍然杳無音訊。
這條全長約2600公里，計劃經蒙古每年向中國輸送500億立方米天然氣的超級管道，被俄羅斯視為失去歐洲市場後的「救命稻草」與戰略命脈。普京原本寄望藉此次訪京，一舉敲定定價、融資與建設時間表，但最終既未簽署任何具有約束力的合同，也未公佈啟動時間，甚至連該項目都未進入克裡姆林宮公佈的成果清單。克宮發言人只能尷尬表示，雙方只是「達成一些總體共識」和「共用理解」。
領導對特朗普說“也許普京已經對發動戰爭後悔”，開戰後中俄關係的主次已經顛倒，俄國完全斷絕了與西方的關係，政經軍事外交科技民生等各方面與中國高度綁定，沒有中國的支援俄國連一個月都支持不下去。普京還想繼續執政就不可能停戰，只要戰爭持續他就仍能控制國內局面，否則軍事失敗停戰即投降。俄羅斯的歷史上對外擴張，無論付出多大代價只要為帝國謀得利益，都會被接受成爲歷史英雄，否則就會被清算是歷史罪人。停戰後且不談賠償問題，即便是撤出烏東地區就意味著戰敗，百萬敗軍撤回國內如何安置穩定，槍口對內最後會造成何種影響。
普京到訪是擔心中方與特朗普暗中密約，出賣俄羅斯即他本人，冷戰當年的結束也建基於中美的合作。因此普京需要得到中方的承諾，“西伯利亞2號”就是一個試金石，俄羅斯根本沒有資金能力建立管道，一切依賴中方但在價格，融資條件，供應安全問題上始終寸步不讓。普京擔心北京未來在伊朗問題，俄烏戰局，全球能源佈局上向美國傾斜，俄羅斯的戰略處境將進一步惡化。中方則試圖借普京訪京，對外營造「掌控美俄」的強勢姿態。
如今的中俄關係中國是話事人，俄羅斯連跟班都談不上。當然所謂的合作無上限，支持俄羅斯進攻烏克蘭，甚至在戰前提供數千億能源大單資助戰爭，造成的結果就是引誘俄羅斯入局消耗戰，轉移西方打壓中國的視綫，無論領導人當時是有心還是無意，但最終結果如此不可逆轉。現在中方同時握著美俄兩張牌，還有伊朗這個籌碼，可以翻雲覆雨。
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