The brief so‑called negotiation period
between the U.S. and Iran is about to end. During this time, Trump applied for
$200 billion in military funding, with troops and equipment already deployed.
What the media described as Trump “TACO” does not exist. The negotiation terms exchanged by the two
countries are nothing but pipe dreams. The next step for the U.S. military—occupying Kharg Island—is inevitable. Once the
island is controlled, it is equivalent to controlling Iran’s oil exports and part of the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. military
has already bombed the island’s ground facilities, and naturally the next move
is ground forces engaging in an island seizure operation.
Some EU countries are
participating in escort missions, and Gulf states joining the fight is already
on the agenda, though more time is needed. Even if the U.S. and Israel wanted a
ceasefire now, Gulf states—under security threats—would still need to intensify
strikes against Iran. A military alliance for sustained attacks on Iran has
already formed, and the war is showing signs of becoming prolonged, lasting
months or even longer depending on circumstances. Israel, despite its absolute
advantage, has struggled with Hamas for a long time; how much more difficult it
would be against Iran, one of the stronger powers in the Middle East. Trump’s
conditions for a ceasefire are clear: Iran must hand over enriched uranium,
establish a pro‑U.S. government, allow free passage through the Strait of Hormuz,
stop all military resistance, let the U.S. dominate oil and gas control, and
refrain from launching special operations against neighboring countries. As
long as Iran refuses, there will be no ceasefire—especially since the U.S. and Israel currently hold absolute
military superiority.
Iran’s ability to resist
relies on the complete military system built for it over decades by China and
Russia. Its vast underground facilities give it the capacity to withstand two
to three rounds of U.S.‑Israeli strikes. Earlier, street protests in Iran were suppressed,
key figures and uprising leaders eliminated, and the government had essentially
stabilized the domestic situation before U.S. attacks began. Unless Iran’s military and irregular forces are completely destroyed, it is
impossible for the public to launch a larger uprising in coordination with
military strikes. Kurdish guerrillas are negligible. Iran still possesses
considerable unconventional warfare capabilities, able to attack neighboring
countries’ energy and civilian infrastructure in ways that are hard to defend
against. The U.S. has no ability to provide total protection.
Eliminating Iran’s military
resistance is the only solution, which requires ground forces to intervene for
actual occupation and target clearance. Entering Kharg Island is not too
difficult for U.S. forces; the challenge lies in eliminating remaining defenders
and securing the island effectively. The island has numerous underground
facilities, and fighting in areas dense with energy infrastructure while
avoiding large‑scale destruction poses certain difficulties. But if Kharg Island
is successfully taken and controlled, Iran’s bargaining power will be greatly
weakened. The war now depends on how long Iran’s stored war energy can last.
The U.S. will not withdraw at least before the midterm elections, and Gulf
states hope to resolve the Iran issue completely.
However, if the war drags
on, Trump may at any time fabricate a reason and suddenly withdraw troops
without warning, shifting the burden of striking Iran onto Israel. Only then
would Iran have a glimmer of survival.
