Trump Leaves, Putin Rushes In — But No Beijing Duck This Time

 

U.S. President Donald Trump has just concluded his visit to Beijing. Aside from a few words on the Iran issue and some vague promises, he gained nothing substantial. The meals in Beijing were good, and he did some sightseeing; his wife wore a qipao that highlighted her figure. As for the trade tariff war, the United States has in fact already lost. China’s rare earth strategy means America’s military industry, automobile sector, and semiconductors would grind to a halt. Even though Trump brought Jensen Huang along at the last minute to agree to chip sales, Beijing indirectly rejected the offer.

Trump can identify America’s problems but lacks the ability to solve them. His so‑called “maximum pressure” approach is not a successful method in business, only occasionally effective in specific circumstances. His flaw is not relying on a strong think tank with plans, priorities, and efficiency, but instead acting on personal will, issuing impulsive and erratic orders. His political wisdom is childlike: he does not understand compromise, retreat, or strategic patience.

His “Twitter governance” produced endless, unreliable promises, creating confusion everywhere, and ultimately collapsing due to flawed measures. Pressure on China may be necessary, but the methods and strategy must be cautious. U.S.–China cooperation has been a basic national policy since the Cold War, respected by successive governments. Now, by cutting ties through tariffs and trade wars, America faces consequences it cannot absorb in the short term, while China benefits by holding firm.

Containing China requires leveraging America’s international influence, uniting global powers, and applying long‑term pressure over decades while building alternatives. In reality, however, America has simultaneously pressured other countries, creating a situation of overreach and misalignment, turning itself into the adversary. The tariff war is effectively over, and the chip blockade has failed. On Iran, America is stuck; on Russia, the issue has become secondary. Trump must find new strategies for the midterm elections.

As soon as Trump left, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Beijing. As in his past visits, he stayed less than a day. Before the war in Ukraine, Putin outwardly cooperated with China but inwardly disliked it. He is a major player in international politics and has no affection for a regional power built by Soviet support. The relationship has always been one of mutual use, with Russia dominant: China buys energy at set prices and pays up. Chinese leaders may flatter endlessly, but Putin remains unmoved. The relationship has never been equal. In energy, food, weapons, geopolitics, and nuclear power, Russia holds absolute strength.

But the war reshuffled everything. Russia has exhausted the Soviet inheritance, a 48‑hour war dragging into four years, with heavy casualties, a passive battlefield, economic collapse, fiscal drain, and international isolation. Putin cannot stay abroad for long without risking domestic instability. This “emergency state visit” drew global attention.

Though they proclaimed “friendship without limits,” signed dozens of agreements, and issued a 47‑page joint statement on “a multipolar world” and “strategic coordination,” Russia’s core need was the “Power of Siberia 2” gas pipeline. Yet no binding contract was signed, no timetable announced, and the project was absent from the Kremlin’s official results list. The Kremlin spokesman awkwardly said only that “general consensus” and “shared understanding” were reached.

Chinese leaders told Trump, “Perhaps Putin already regrets starting the war.” Since the war began, the balance in Sino‑Russian relations has reversed. Russia has severed ties with the West, binding itself to China in politics, economy, military, diplomacy, technology, and daily life. Without Chinese support, Russia could not last a month. For Putin, continuing the war is the only way to stay in power; stopping would mean defeat and surrender.

In Russian history, external expansion, however costly, is accepted if it benefits the empire, making leaders heroes. Failure, however, means being condemned as criminals. Ending the war, even withdrawing from eastern Ukraine, would mean defeat. How to resettle and stabilize a million defeated troops returning home? Turning guns inward would destabilize the country.

Putin’s visit was driven by fear that Beijing might secretly strike a deal with Trump, betraying Russia. The Cold War ended largely due to U.S.–China cooperation. Thus Putin sought assurances. “Power of Siberia 2” is the test case. Russia lacks the funds to build it, relying entirely on China, but Beijing refuses to budge on price, financing, and supply security. Putin fears China may tilt toward the U.S. on Iran, Ukraine, and global energy, worsening Russia’s strategic position. China, meanwhile, uses Putin’s visit to project an image of controlling both Washington and Moscow.

Today, in Sino‑Russian relations, China calls the shots; Russia is not even a follower. The “no limits” partnership, support for Russia’s invasion, and pre‑war multi‑billion energy deals all lured Russia into a war of attrition, diverting Western pressure away from China. Whether intentional or not, the outcome is irreversible. Now China holds both U.S. and Russian cards, plus Iran as a bargaining chip, able to manipulate the global stage.