Trump’s delay in visiting China is to see who blinks first over Iran

 

Trump has postponed his visit to China, citing the intensifying conflict in the Middle East with Iran. His earlier proposal for international escort missions in the Strait of Hormuz received little response, and China has remained silent. The delay benefits both sides: Trump can use it as leverage, while China needs time to reassess its internal strategy.

Iran’s strongest backer against the United States is China. As the U.S. and Israel launch full‑scale attacks on Iran, Tehran has struck neighboring countries while attempting to blockade the Strait. Strategically, the former is “you fight your war, I fight mine,” while the latter is “unrestricted warfare special attack”—both concepts taught by China, with Iran merely the executor. Beijing did not anticipate Washington would truly strike Iran; Israel’s attacks were expected, but U.S. foreign policy has been stable since the Cold War, with little uncertainty. Historically, U.S.–China relations were more cooperative than confrontational. Yet with Trump and China’s new leadership, the long‑standing balance has been broken.

During the Cold War, the U.S. and China cooperated against the Soviet Union. Afterward, comprehensive cooperation became the norm. Now, personal will from both leaders has turned relations into direct confrontation: China promotes the “community of shared destiny” and the rise of the East, while Trump’s “Make America Great Again” demands eliminating competitors. Iran, the strongest anti‑American force in the Middle East, has become the flashpoint. China will not easily escort the Strait of Hormuz, as ensuring safe passage would mean betraying Iran. With Israel having largely neutralized Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran’s only options are blockade and ground warfare. Drones and missiles will eventually be exhausted; despite Iran’s manufacturing capacity, it cannot withstand relentless U.S.–Israeli pressure.

Launching a “people’s war” on the ground requires public support, absolute military control, and strong external aid—none of which Iran currently possesses. Blockading the Strait is low‑cost, high‑impact, and immediately effective, which is why Trump’s escort plan has no takers. China needs time to evaluate Iran’s situation, ultimately deciding whether to continue support or use Iran as a bargaining chip. The U.S. does not seek to rule Iran but aims to dismantle the theocracy, install a pro‑American regime, eliminate nuclear weapons, secure oil, and remove threats to Israel. The U.S.–Iran conflict stems from earlier policy misjudgments: Iran was once Washington’s closest ally in the region, with strong ties to Israel. For America, restoring normal relations with Iran would naturally dissolve anti‑U.S. forces in the Middle East.

Iran is the backbone of anti‑American sentiment in the region, and China is its largest patron and energy importer. If Iran is neutralized, China will suffer backlash—just as in Venezuela, where massive investments were lost and energy supplies restricted. China’s urgent priority is to preserve Iran’s government, but that inevitably means concessions to Trump. Both sides now need time to adjust, but the final decisions may depend less on national interest than on the personal will of their leaders.