Has Uncle Hun Sen’s Backer Fallen? – The International Drama Behind Thailand’s Military Crackdown

 

Thailand’s military crackdown on Cambodia has been remarkably smooth. The world‑plaguing hubs of telecom fraud, gambling centers, and human organ trafficking institutions have been continuously struck. In recent years, Cambodia’s economic development has relied heavily on the rapid growth of these criminal industries, with the government even making them a focal point of national economic revitalization, supported by neighboring countries. As a tourism hub in Southeast Asia, Thailand has suffered greatly: countless tourists have been scammed, kidnapped, gone missing, or even killed. This has dealt a severe blow to Thailand’s economy and tarnished its international image, ultimately prompting Thailand to decisively employ military means to eradicate Cambodia’s criminal industries and strike hard against Hun Sen’s government.

Given the disparity in military strength between the two countries, Thailand’s operations have faced virtually no resistance. Having already dismantled border crime bases, Thai forces have advanced inland, conducting systematic sweeps. However, a complete eradication of these industries will take time. Unless the Chinese government formally intervenes with strong measures, Thailand’s military campaign is unlikely to stop in the short or medium term. In fact, the masterminds, workers, and victims of Cambodia’s criminal industries are predominantly Chinese, with close ties to China’s elite families. Before launching its operations, Thailand carefully weighed all factors and acted only after securing U.S. support. These criminal industries are despised worldwide—whether in Southeast Asia, China, or overseas—but due to years of protection from a major power, they had remained unchecked.

China’s response has been subtle. Beyond formal calls for a ceasefire, it has offered no tangible assistance to Cambodia. Objectively, if China were to intervene forcefully to protect Cambodia, it would be unable to escape international condemnation for fostering criminal industries. Moreover, revelations show that shareholders of Cambodia’s organ trafficking research centers are Chinese state medical institutions and companies. The SIM cards used in telecom fraud are issued by Chinese telecom firms, and the gambling dens are backed by Chinese financiers. Organ trafficking is considered a crime against humanity, and most victims of other criminal industries are also Chinese. Directly shielding these industries would be indefensible internationally, so Beijing has shifted blame onto Cambodia’s government. Cambodia’s military, though armed by China, is too weak to resist comprehensively. Facing inevitable defeat, China sees little reason to intervene directly, which would invite global criticism. With the U.S. openly involved, Beijing is further constrained, especially after the recent lull in the U.S.–China trade war, where China had gained a slight advantage. Avoiding excessive provocation of Washington is now a priority.

The Indo‑Pacific strategy was originally spearheaded by Abe and Trump. With Abe gone and Trump’s trade war unpopular, India’s defeat in the May air battle against Pakistan (backed by China) shifted the focus from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. This led to enhanced U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Japan’s pledge to defend Taiwan, and Thailand’s military strike against Cambodia (backed by China). The aim is to reshape China’s regional blueprint built through the Belt and Road Initiative. Russia’s Putin has aligned with Trump, while China’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy has left it isolated internationally. The Indo‑Pacific strategy has evolved from “westward offense, eastward defense” before the trade war into “eastward offense, westward defense,” designed to contain China’s expansionist ambitions.

China itself faces severe internal challenges: economic decline, political turmoil, fierce infighting, diplomatic isolation, and public discontent. Military power struggles have intensified, and the leadership’s grip on authority is unstable. Over a decade of carefully crafted projects—from the Belt and Road Initiative to Xiong’an New Area, from the Beijing Stock Exchange to even Chinese football—have largely failed, weakening national strength and global influence. While criminal industries in Cambodia and Myanmar have thrived, they have inflicted heavy damage on Southeast Asia’s economies, ultimately driving Thailand closer to the U.S. and prompting direct action against Cambodia.

Hillary Clinton’s “pivot to Asia” strategy was never clearly defined, as the U.S. never truly withdrew from Asia. ASEAN’s ten nations have long relied on the U.S. politically while leaning toward China economically. The current situation is more complex: the Philippines and Vietnam confront China head‑on, Myanmar and Cambodia are aligned with Beijing, while others remain neutral or hedge both sides. Thailand, historically neutral, has now tilted toward the U.S., a move of great significance. China’s support for its Southeast Asian client states has always relied on exporting benefits, with the rise of criminal industries becoming a by‑product of the Belt and Road. This crackdown severely undermines China’s influence. The criminal parks—telecom fraud centers, organ trafficking institutions, and casinos—are all backed by Chinese elites with ties to the highest leadership. Amid China’s internal turmoil, its ability to respond to this sudden blow is limited.

If Southeast Asian nations collectively align with the U.S., the entire Indo‑Pacific region, possibly including Russia, will form a ring of encirclement against China. Although Russia, with China’s support, has managed to sustain its position in the Ukraine war, prolonged conflict will eventually exhaust Putin. Russia’s ultimate downfall is foreseeable. Once that war ends and the world’s second‑strongest military power is defeated, the day of encircling the third‑strongest power will arrive. Thus, Thailand’s military strike against Cambodia’s criminal industries carries strategic weight: it not only dismantles illicit enterprises and weakens Hun Sen’s government but also reshapes Southeast Asia’s order.