Putin to Trump: China wants war, North Korea needs money, so no ceasefire

 

Even with Trump's mediation, Russia refuses to ceasefire. Although the current U.S. bias is exactly what Putin desires, the situation has not unfolded as expected. Russia's economy, still maintaining 3-5% annual growth, is entirely driven by a war economy. Without this, years of global sanctions would have led to economic collapse and widespread hardship, making it difficult to sustain. Despite the loss of a million soldiers and vast amounts of military equipment, most casualties come from remote regions' ethnic minorities and marginalized groups, including criminals and the homeless. Major Russian cities remain largely unaffected, and with the government's tacit approval, many urban youths fled early in the war. Thus, the million casualties have not shaken the country's foundation but rather reduced the burden by "clearing out" low-end populations.

Historically, Russia has always relied on massive personnel losses to cope with large-scale wars. The Slavic attitude toward death is almost indifferent, showing little concern for the number of lives expended in war. Russia has long been a serfdom-based state, where serfs were at the disposal of landowners but nominally belonged to the Tsar. Landowners had usage rights but not ownership, and while serfs were guaranteed minimal survival conditions by the Tsar's decree, their depletion was utterly disregarded. Military officers came from the nobility, while soldiers were peasants and serfs, treated as mere "gray mules," barely valued above animals. Thus, the Russian military has a longstanding tradition of disregarding soldiers' lives. During World War II, retreating soldiers faced execution, their families were sent to Siberia to eat potatoes, while charging forward earned black bread, and families received potatoes to survive. Soldiers' lives were measured in terms of potatoes and black bread.

For many unemployed, alcoholic, smoking, abusive, uneducated men with no prospects in Russia's peripheral regions, dying on the frontlines for millions of rubles in government payouts is not necessarily a bad deal for their local economies or families. Russian men, with a life expectancy of just over 50 due to chronic alcoholism, have little to lose. Moreover, Russia has historically blurred the line between soldiers and civilians, with potentially tens of millions available to be sent to the battlefield. As for weapons, Russia inherited vast Soviet stockpiles, sufficient for prolonged conventional warfare, supplemented by some advanced equipment. North Korea's soldiers and weapons further bolster this, as their situation mirrors Russia's. Thus, a 21st-century war has devolved into World War I-style trench warfare, with drones absent, as if returning to a century ago. Russia's technological, logistical, and intelligence capabilities lag far behind the West, so it relies on its strength: attrition, betting on who can endure greater losses.

Currently, apart from most of Luhansk being occupied, the frontlines are in a stalemate with Ukrainian forces, with Crimea also under strain. The goal of occupying the four eastern regions is to connect them with Crimea, ensuring a viable independent entity linked to Russia. Without this, the "special military operation" is meaningless. Ukraine, after three years of war, has built a million-strong, well-equipped, and battle-hardened army, gradually gaining air superiority with Western support. A ceasefire is meaningless for Russia unless Ukraine's military is dismantled, as it could counterattack with NATO support at any time. If Russia withdraws from the costly eastern territories, they risk being lost again in the long term, and Russia's economic strength is insufficient for reconstruction or long-term stabilization. The hard-won stalemate keeps Ukraine's air superiority in check by maintaining close-quarters combat.

China's stance is also a factor. As Russia's main financial backer, China benefits from a prolonged war where Russia neither wins nor Ukraine loses. This prevents the West from fully focusing on China, and Russia's energy revenues and goods largely come from China. A ceasefire would intensify U.S. pressure on China, escalating trade and tariff conflicts, and China would lose Russia as a key counterweight against the U.S. With Trump's term limited to three years (or longer if re-elected, though an octogenarian has limited time), Russia is unlikely to abandon its current partial advantage if the U.S. returns to a confrontational stance. With Chinese financial support, Russia can sustain the war and even open a second front to divert Ukraine's forces, targeting Poland, Finland, or the Baltic states.

Domestically, Putin's control relies on nationalism, internal repression, military rule, propaganda, and speech control, with wartime conditions being key. As long as the war continues, he maintains a high-pressure grip, fostering unity against external threats. If the war ends, opposition could resurge, and returning soldiers and weapons pose a domestic threat. Prigozhin's brief rebellion, advancing hundreds of kilometers toward Moscow with a small force, nearly toppled Putin. Troops are easier to control on the frontlines than back home, where they become destabilizing. At his advanced age, Putin emulates Stalin: as long as the nation is at war, he remains the undisputed national leader. With no decisive military advantage yet, Russia lacks favorable negotiation leverage. To maintain the status quo, Putin will fight to the end, never allowing Ukraine a chance to regroup.