Putin’s visit to Vietnam yielded no results. As he
left, he helplessly remarked, “Everything depends on ourselves.” Despite the
close relationship between the two countries since the 1950s, Vietnam’s current
pro-Western policies make them cautious about Russia’s cooperation proposals.
The visit was mainly based on party relations, and military cooperation similar
to that with North Korea is unlikely. Unlike North Korea and Iran, which are
isolated countries, Vietnam sees greater benefits in cooperating with the West.
Moreover, Vietnam’s ruling party is relatively stable, and supporting Putin
risks offending the West. Additionally, Putin’s nuclear cooperation proposal is
sensitive, forcing the Vietnamese government to consider the attitudes of
neighboring countries. With no valuable bargaining chips, Vietnam’s reception
of Putin was lukewarm despite the red carpet.
Although North Korea and Russia signed a strategic
partnership, both leaders were indifferent during their talks. North Korea
provided nearly 6 million rounds of ammunition, including missiles, rockets,
and various artillery shells, to Russia. With a daily consumption of at least
30,000 rounds, this supply can barely last six months, which was the basis for
Russia’s counteroffensive months ago when Ukraine faced a shortage of
ammunition due to a U.S. supply cut. After months of consumption, the ammunition
is running out, necessitating further discussions with North Korea. Russia’s
biggest ally, needing to avoid Western sanctions, must also transfer some aid
to North Korea. When Kim Jong-un first visited Russia, Putin showed little
respect, and no substantial agreements were signed, with the large North Korean
delegation housed in university dormitories.
Post-Cold War, the relationship between the two
countries stagnated. Although Russia was part of the “Six-Party Talks,” it
lacked interest in cooperation with North Korea and played no significant role.
Despite a decades-long honeymoon period after the Korean War, mainly due to
geopolitical influences, the Soviet Union adopted a one-sided aid policy
towards North Korea. After the Cold War, relations cooled. North Korea, always
in a state of war, never stopped producing ammunition, maintaining ample stockpiles.
Given the massive ammunition consumption on the Russia-Ukraine battlefield,
North Korean ammunition, though old and of poor quality, with much of it
decades-old and poorly managed, can still provide emergency support to Russia.
It is ironic that a former world military power is now seeking ammunition aid
from North Korea, whose military industry was established by the Soviet Union.
For Putin, having to flatter Kim Jong-un is hard to accept, especially since
Kim knows he has always been looked down upon by Russia. However, both sides
have to comply due to their respective needs.
As a result, South Korea has opened up its weapons
usage rights to Ukraine. South Korean weapons are essentially platforms for
Western military technology, making them Korean versions of Western weapons.
South Korea’s military industry has continued to produce weapons efficiently,
with high capacity and advanced performance, making them popular
internationally. The production system seamlessly integrates with the West. As
the war progresses, weapons from South Korea and Turkey are developing rapidly.
The so-called opening to Ukraine is merely a statement, as South Korean weapons
have long been entering the Ukrainian battlefield through NATO. Whether North
Korea and Russia form an alliance is irrelevant.
The only country that can meet Russia’s military aid
needs is Putin’s biggest supporter and ally, the U.S.'s so-called competitor.
This country can produce all the military and civilian supplies and equipment
needed for a medium-scale war, with enormous production capacity. If their
cooperation develops into an alliance, with direct military aid and even troop
deployment, the situation in the Russia-Ukraine war would fundamentally change.
Therefore, for Western countries, controlling this competitor’s full alignment
with Russia is crucial. It is now a consensus that Russia will inevitably be
defeated in the long run. The two most important uncertainties in the future
development of the Russia-Ukraine war are whether Putin will use nuclear
weapons and whether the ally will directly intervene. Currently, the likelihood
of Russia using nuclear weapons immediately is low, and it is difficult to
judge whether the ally will gradually send troops like NATO, as decisions in
authoritarian countries depend on personal will rather than logical and
rational interests.
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