The greatest impact
of a U.S.–Israel war against Iran is the surge in global oil prices, which
raises fears that the world economy could slip into recession due to inflation.
Objectively speaking, before the war began, the U.S. had already anticipated that
global energy prices would spike in the short term if the Strait of Hormuz were
blocked. As the world’s largest energy exporter, the U.S. is fully capable of
using its influence to bring oil prices back down. In reality, Iran did not
block the strait; the so‑called attacked tankers were merely Iranian and Russian oil
vessels.
From a military
perspective, a joint U.S.–Israel strike on Iran poses no difficulty. Months
earlier, Iran’s nuclear facilities had already been hit. The only real threat
Iran can pose to the U.S. and Israel is nuclear weapons. Unless a large‑scale ground
offensive is launched, Iran’s military strength
cannot compare with theirs. Iran’s navy and air force
have been largely destroyed, and valuable domestic targets have been
comprehensively struck. The current war is more symbolic than substantive. Its
future progress depends on negotiations between the Iranian government and the
U.S., and on how far each side is willing to compromise. Iran has declared it
will not accept unconditional surrender, but it is not opposed to talks. In
fact, the war was triggered precisely because negotiations had stalled, and
Trump launched strikes on Iran to divert domestic tensions.
The key question now
is what conditions Iran’s military and clerical forces will demand. The war’s
tempo is dictated by the U.S. and Israel. If they wish to end it quickly,
eliminating Supreme Leader Khamenei and Iran’s leadership would suffice. If
they prefer it to drag on, it can last indefinitely. Much depends on
U.S.–Israeli intent and Iran’s endurance. China and Russia have made clear they
will not support Iran. Given Iran’s strength, it cannot simultaneously confront
the world’s foremost military powers. A nationwide guerrilla “people’s war” is
unrealistic—the conflict originated in mass protests. Iran’s strikes on
neighboring countries are merely attempts to sow regional chaos, drive up
energy prices, and gain leverage in future negotiations.
Iran still has some
missiles and drones in stock, but once these are depleted, the war will be
difficult to sustain. The claim that Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz, causing
tankers to pile up, is false. The real reason is that shipping insurers suddenly
stopped offering war‑risk coverage, and shipping companies, for safety, ordered tankers
to anchor until the conflict ends. Rising oil prices benefit producers, but
hurt countries overly dependent on Iranian energy—chiefly China. Thus, a prolonged war plays into Trump’s hands ahead
of his visit to China, giving him a powerful bargaining chip. China’s “rare
earth card” in the trade war has already lost its bite.
The U.S. does not
seek to occupy Iran outright. Trump’s goal is to use energy leverage to topple
the current Iranian government and install a pro‑U.S. regime. Before
the clerical regime took power, Iran was America’s closest ally in the Middle East, and even had strong ties with
Israel. The rise of the theocracy was largely due to U.S. foreign policy
missteps. Ayatollah Khomeini himself was escorted back to Iran by the U.S. The
long‑standing “Iran problem” is therefore in part America’s own making. Iran’s support for
Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas may appear homegrown, but behind the scenes,
funding often involves Russia and China. In this sense, Iran is an extension of
the Cold War confrontation among the U.S., Russia, and China.
Resolving the Iran
issue would go a long way toward stabilizing the Middle East. The outcome of
the Russia–Ukraine war is already apparent; today’s battles are largely
procedural. Putin is Trump’s ally, and once the Iran problem is settled, the
focus will inevitably shift to U.S.–China rivalry. China may have won the first
round of the trade war with rare earths, but the next round—the energy war—has
already begun.
