Trump’s military strikes against Iran are caught in a dilemma, and one could even say they have already failed. A long-term military presence in Iran is impossible, and launching a ground offensive is unrealistic. In fact, Iran’s military strength has already been severely damaged. What Iran is now carrying out are sporadic special attacks against America’s Middle Eastern allies and the Strait of Hormuz.Trump’s reasons for striking Iran are twofold: on the one hand, he was misled by Israel—just as Putin believed he could solve the Ukraine problem in 48 hours; on the other hand, the capture of Maduro led to a misjudgment, making Trump think Iran could be easily dealt with.
In Venezuela, the people were destitute and the government had
lost support. Maduro could only rely on Cuban personnel for security. Weapons
supplied by China and Russia proved ineffective, and Russia even betrayed
Maduro’s whereabouts as a bargaining chip. Moreover, Venezuela is a small Latin
American country with limited military strength, which ultimately led to the
president being easily captured. Iran, however, is a vast country with a large
population, strong military power, long-standing war experience, a complete
weapons production industry, and nuclear development capability. It has long
been ruled by a theocratic government and is a leading force in the Middle East
opposing Israel and the U.S., with open support from China and Russia. America
has the strength to strike Iran, but it does not have the ability to resolve
the Iran problem in the short or medium term.
Iran’s nuclear development has already been monitored under the
UN framework. Its nuclear facilities have been repeatedly attacked and largely
destroyed, delaying its nuclear progress significantly. Much of its military
power has been eliminated, and many leaders have been killed. Restoring Iran’s
military strength will require enormous manpower, resources, foreign aid, and
time. The harsh U.S.-Israeli strikes have already achieved their purpose; now
the question is how both sides will end the conflict.
Trump’s “maximum pressure” only works on small countries with
limited strength. Against major powers with countermeasures, it is ineffective.
This clumsy businessman’s tricks may work briefly but often fail in
international politics. Although the U.S. is the world’s military hegemon, it
cannot fully cover its Middle Eastern allies, and it struggles to cope with
Iran’s low-cost drone and missile attacks. Trump’s military strikes were
intended to boost his midterm election prospects, cover up failures in the U.S.-China
trade war, his collusion and inaction in the Russia-Ukraine war, and his
incompetence in stimulating the domestic economy. If America cannot decisively
defeat Iran, eliminate its ability to strike U.S. allies, and fully secure the
Strait of Hormuz, then this military action is a failure. America cannot repeat
the quagmire of Afghanistan; a ground war against Iran is impossible, and a
complete solution to the Iran problem is unattainable. On the contrary, with
Chinese and Russian support, Iran is launching “unrestricted warfare” against
the U.S., complicating the regional situation and gaining results.
The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has driven up oil prices,
dragging down global economic growth. Attacks on neighboring countries prevent
the U.S. from withdrawing from the Middle East battlefield. In negotiations,
America cannot gain absolute advantage, and “maximum pressure” has lost its
effectiveness. Iran’s low-cost special attacks make Trump’s military action
meaningless: it cannot force the Iranian government to collapse or compromise,
cannot boost his midterm election campaign, cannot divert attention from
domestic problems, and cannot please the MAGA faction. Even Israel’s strikes
against Hamas required years of street-by-street, tunnel-by-tunnel clearing
under overwhelming military superiority—how much more difficult against Iran, a
Middle Eastern military power. After decapitating leaders, replacements quickly
emerge. Leaderless decentralization means Iran’s armed forces fight
independently, but the regime’s structure remains intact. Losing hundreds of
leaders does not destroy the government or military.
Iran’s theocratic government, secular intellectuals,
Revolutionary Guards, state army, and local militias all continue to operate
without central checks. Without ground assaults, the Iranian government still
controls the country, and its armed forces remain largely intact. Trump now
faces Iran’s “unrestricted warfare,” guided for years by China. Fortunately, it
is still in its early stages. If it develops further, it will inevitably lead
to terrorist attacks on U.S. soil and assassinations of American leaders.
Should domestic security be compromised, Trump’s government would collapse, and
he himself would face retribution.
In reality, striking Iran has partially lifted restrictions on
Russian energy, giving Moscow the foreign exchange needed for war. China,
meanwhile, benefits from the energy crisis by boosting exports of new energy
products. Russia is an energy giant, China has reserves and years of new energy
development—continued war in Iran benefits both, while offering little to the
U.S. and Israel, and severely harming Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast
Asia, which depend on Middle Eastern energy.
Global recession, worsening U.S. inflation, and economic decline
all point to the need to end the war against Iran quickly, or to produce a
ceasefire plan acceptable to both sides. But in reality, Trump seems to have
exhausted his options. Beyond continued military strikes and “maximum
pressure,” he has no strategy. Iran has already grasped Trump’s bottom line.
America lacks the ability to solve the Iran problem, and Iran is gradually
gaining the upper hand at the negotiating table. Trump’s Iran problem mirrors
his trade war: loud in rhetoric, weak in results, ultimately a failure. As for
reversing his midterm election disadvantage—that is out of the question.
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