2025年12月24日 星期三
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2025年12月23日 星期二
The Red Army City Battle Royale: Putin’s Gamble and Ukraine’s Boiling Frog Strategy
The
Ukrainian army has recaptured half of Red Army City and destroyed Russia’s
elite 76th Guards Division. Putin’s order to seize Red Army City as a
bargaining chip has once again failed—this time under the premise that Trump
has completely withdrawn from NATO and stopped aiding Ukraine. Meanwhile,
European countries bordering Russia, including the Baltic states, Sweden, and
Finland, have openly declared plans to build forces that would directly fight
Russia if Ukraine were defeated. Britain, France, and Germany are also
attempting to bypass the EU and deploy troops into Ukraine, with the stated
condition of avoiding direct clashes with Russian forces. Yet since the war
began, such conditions have proven illusory, serving only to buy time while
gradually implementing intervention. From a broader perspective, even without
U.S. support, as long as Europe establishes a reliable support mechanism,
Ukraine can continue the war—at least until the U.S. midterm elections, when
American politics may shift.
Currently,
neither side has the ability to annihilate the other militarily. Ukraine has
been under nationwide military mobilization for four years, steadily
strengthening its capabilities. Russia, by contrast, has no better option than
attritional warfare, maintaining a stalemated front line. Over four years,
Russian forces have suffered massive losses in personnel, equipment,
ammunition, logistics, and supplies, while enduring Ukrainian raids and
relentless international sanctions. Ukraine has already struck Russia’s energy
facilities across the board and now targets civilian infrastructure and
transport hubs. Russia’s economy is increasingly strained, with energy exports
slashed and revenues plummeting. Yet the basic funding for war continues thanks
to Chinese support. In short, as long as China provides lifelines, Russia can
keep fighting until the international situation changes. As long as the war
persists, the West cannot fully pressure China, since Western economies remain
deeply tied to China. Trump’s trade war has already failed, leaving China in a
position of advantage. Moreover, under Trump’s global pressure, many U.S.
allies hedge their bets, cooperating with China to offset American influence.
America’s
explicit refusal to support Ukraine is effectively a withdrawal from NATO,
reducing its influence in Europe and weakening its global posture. This
indirectly boosts China’s leverage, strengthened by the trade war outcome. For
Europe, supporting Ukraine to wear down Russia is the obvious path. Putin, now
in his seventies, cannot sustain a decade‑long war like Afghanistan;
another five years would likely exhaust both Russia and Putin. Meanwhile, China’s internal environment is also
shifting. Trump’s collusion with Russia has triggered backlash at home. If U.S.
military aid is cut off, the biggest losers will be American arms
manufacturers. For four years, Western defense industries have operated around
the clock, producing nonstop. To sustain the front, Europe and the wider world
have scoured for ammunition. If the war drags on for several more years,
Western defense industries will return to Cold War levels. At that point, even
if Russia wanted to stop, it would be difficult.
Russia
and Putin are gambling with national destiny. For Putin, whether he can endure
or not—even considering nuclear options—defeat would mean certain death and
Russia’s disintegration. Thus, securing a relatively dignified ceasefire
agreement through Trump’s help is crucial, though Trump’s time is limited.
Everything now hinges on Russia’s battlefield performance. Yet the Russian army
falls far short of its reputation as the world’s second‑strongest military. It can only
keep filling the front lines with troops, relying on sheer numbers to launch
meaningless tactical assaults, hoping to blunt Ukraine’s advantages.
Maintaining the current front and achieving symbolic victories—such as Bakhmut
before and Red Army City now—would strengthen Russia’s bargaining position. But
so far, these attempts have failed.
For
Putin, prolonging the war itself is victory. Trump’s withdrawal means Russia
only needs to confront Europe, and historically Russia has had many ways to
deal with Europe. Thus, Putin is not entirely disadvantaged. If Europe descends
into full‑scale
war while America stands aside, Russia might even turn the tide—especially with nuclear options
and Trump’s government as external support. For Ukraine, rushing to
reclaim territory and win outright may not be the best strategy. Instead,
gradual attrition across all fronts—military, morale, energy, transport,
defense industry, civilian infrastructure, industrial base, and agriculture—is
wiser. Militarily, Ukraine should avoid reckless offensives. This “boiling
frog” approach, sustained for another four years, could produce decisive
change. Ukraine is shifting from pure military strikes to comprehensive attrition,
combining fighting and negotiating, alternating between talks and battles, to
prolong the war indefinitely.
Once
Russia’s resources are completely exhausted, Ukraine can unite with the EU to
launch a decisive counteroffensive, finally resolving Europe’s peace and
security dilemma. As for Trump, it seems Abe has been waiting for him for quite
some time.
紅軍城大逃殺：普京的豪賭與烏克蘭的溫水青蛙
烏克蘭軍隊奪回了紅軍城近半，並且近日還消滅了俄軍主力近衛76師，普京下死命令必須奪下紅軍城，作爲談判籌碼的打算再次破滅，而且是在特朗普全面退出北約，不再援助烏克蘭的大前提下。另一方面與俄國接壤的歐洲國家，包括波羅的海三國和瑞典芬蘭等，公開表明將籌建部隊，如烏克蘭戰敗則直接對俄作戰，英法德也嘗試跳過歐盟，直接派遣部隊進駐烏克蘭，前提是不直接與俄軍發生軍事衝突，但自開戰以來這種前提和承諾被證明是虛擬的，目的無非是避免中短期內過份刺激俄國，然後爭取時間逐步進行落實。從宏觀看烏克蘭即便沒有美國，只要歐洲有確定的支援機制，將戰爭繼續下去的可能性很大，至少能夠堅持到美國中期選舉，美國政治形勢發生變化之後。
目前俄烏各方都沒有在軍事上消滅對方的能力，但烏克蘭進入全國軍事狀態4年之久，而且軍事能力在不斷增強，反觀俄羅斯除了力拼消耗外沒有更好的辦法，最多就是維持目前陷入僵局的戰綫。俄軍4年來軍力消耗過大，不但是人員，裝備，彈藥，後勤和各類補給，而且飽受烏克蘭的襲擾和國際上的不斷制裁。烏克蘭已經將俄國能源設施全部打擊一遍，現在發展到襲擊民生設施和交通樞紐的地步。俄國經濟也開始飽受困擾，能源出口大受打擊收入驟減，但維持戰爭的最基本資金需求，得益於中國的支持不受影響。簡而言之只要中國輸血，俄國還能夠打下去，直到國際形勢有所轉變。只要俄烏戰爭持續歐美就不可能打壓中國，相反歐美經濟與中國高度綁定，互相牽扯難於切割，特朗普發動的貿易戰已經失敗，中國占據優勢而且無法逆轉。況且在特朗普的全球打壓下，很多支持美國的國家開始兩邊下注，與中國勾兌共同抵消美國的影響。
美國明確表示不支持烏克蘭，實際上是變相退出北約，如此在歐洲的影響力變小，在國際上也不可能維持強勢，如此中國的影響力反而因爲貿易戰而增加。歐洲只要支持烏克蘭長期消耗俄羅斯，最後的結果是顯而易見的，畢竟普京是七旬老人，按照阿富汗戰爭的十年來算，再打5年俄國和普京都很難支撐下去，畢竟中國內部環境也在發生變化。特朗普現在勾結俄國在國內也引發反彈，如果完全斷絕軍援最受影響的無疑是美國的軍火商，4年來歐美的軍工企業幾乎是24小時的不停生產，爲了維持戰綫歐美國家甚至全世界範圍內尋找彈藥，如果再堅持數年歐美軍工企業恢復到冷戰狀態，屆時即便俄國單方面想停戰也困難了。
俄國和普京都是在賭國運，對於普京無論是否能堅持到最後，甚至發展到採取核武選項，只要戰敗他必然是死無葬身之地，俄國肯定會分崩離析。因此對於他來講通過特朗普的幫助，取得相對體面的停戰協定至關重要，畢竟特朗普的時間也很有限，現在關鍵就看俄軍在戰場上的表現。但俄軍實在與世界第二軍事大國的身份相差太遠了。目前只能通過不斷在前綫填充部隊，靠人數優勢不斷發動沒有意義的戰術攻擊，來限制烏克蘭軍隊的軍事優勢，通過體量優勢來抵消軍事頹勢。只要維持目前的戰綫並且能夠局部反擊下，攻克具有代表性的軍事目標，都會增加談判的籌碼，正如之前的巴赫穆特和現在的紅軍城，但直至目前都是事與願違。
對於普京來講無論戰爭的輸贏與否，只要將俄烏戰爭持續下去就是勝利，而且特朗普的退出代表俄國只要對付歐洲即可，歷史上俄羅斯對付歐洲的方法很多。所以，對於普京現在並非處於完全的劣勢，如果歐洲爆發全面戰爭美國置之不理，俄國完全有可能反敗爲勝，況且還有核武的選項，美國的特朗普政府作爲外援。所以，對於烏克蘭來講儘快收復失地贏得戰爭也非最佳選擇，而是持續性的逐步消耗，不僅在軍事上而且在人員士氣，能源設備，交通樞紐，軍工產業，民生設施，工業基礎，農業生產等各個方面，不斷消耗對方才是上策，在軍事上反而不能採取過激行動。這種溫水煮青蛙的方式，再持續4年將會產生質變。烏克蘭從現在的注重軍事打擊，轉向到持續全方位消耗，對於美俄採取邊打邊談，打打談談，時談時打的策略，打談結合爭取時間，將戰爭長期化甚至永久化。
等待俄國戰爭資源徹底耗盡後，烏克蘭再聯合歐盟給予俄國，一個決定性的大反攻，最終徹底解決歐洲和平安全問題。至於特朗普估計安倍已經等待他許久了。
From Newcastle’s Halftime Collapse to the Bald Coach’s Exit: Chelsea’s Christmas Nightmare
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Right
after Maresca publicly stated that he had not received support from the club in
the past 48 hours, rumors quickly spread that he would be Manchester City’s
successor once their coach departed. Although these claims were later denied,
the timing was suspicious, as Maresca had just changed his agency—clearly
suggesting manipulation behind the scenes. Then came Chelsea’s away match
against Newcastle: the Blues collapsed in the first half, conceding two goals,
and only managed to claw back to a draw in the second half. Despite having a
chance to win after halftime, the early deficit proved costly. Enzo Fernández
was absent, leaving the midfield lacking hardness and connection. The central
defenders repeatedly made mistakes, while Fofana’s return was below standard,
exposing the defense and allowing Newcastle’s tall striker to score easily. On
the left, Garnacho repeatedly broke through, but as everyone knows, he can
dribble but cannot deliver decisive passes or shots—his finishing wildly
unpredictable. Countless chances were wasted, and Chelsea had to rely on a
captain’s free kick and striker Padu’s scrappy effort to equalize, hardly a
product of tactical coordination.
Maresca
is undoubtedly a good coach, but not yet a top‑tier one. He has no truly
remarkable achievements, essentially serving as an assistant to famous
managers. Though he has occasionally won trophies such as the Club World Cup
and the Europa Conference League, those were flashes of inspiration, often
thanks to Cole Palmer’s individual brilliance. He is
frequently criticized for rigid squad rotation, mechanical substitutions, and
poor tactical preparation. He even lacks the basic understanding that winning
titles requires beating mid‑table
teams consistently while aiming to avoid defeat against stronger sides. His
lineups change every match, often inexplicably. Against Newcastle, for example,
Enzo warmed up but never got a chance to play, leaving the midfield in disarray
and the team nearly collapsing. His claim of “not being supported” reflects the club’s search for his replacement.
Chelsea has a history of frequent managerial changes, and this season several
clubs have improved after switching coaches. Even mid‑table sides have climbed into
the top six thanks to sound tactics. Chelsea’s slump during the Christmas
period has become routine: struggling even against relegation candidates, while
only showing flashes against stronger teams. Under such conditions, winning the
league is nearly impossible.
The
idea of “giving enough time for the team to grow” is unrealistic—two seasons
should be sufficient, and big clubs cannot afford to wait without results.
Although a coaching change is unlikely right now, the club has already
consulted Crystal Palace’s manager. After the World Cup, more options will be
available: Brazil’s Carlo Ancelotti, England’s Tuchel, and even Mourinho, who
once brought glory to Chelsea. Many top coaches are open to returning. Tuchel
often attends matches, Mourinho recently revisited Stamford Bridge in an
emotional gesture, and Ancelotti once delivered a domestic double. There are
only a handful of elite coaches worldwide, and Chelsea must hire one to achieve
success.
In recent years, Chelsea’s transfer and managerial decisions have been problematic: buying only young players instead of the best, hiring coaches they like rather than those most suitable. Under American ownership, chaos was inevitable—seen in other clubs too—but Chelsea’s massive spending with little coherence is especially disappointing. Since Trump’s rise brought erratic governance, American investors have similarly mismanaged Chelsea. Given that U.S. influence has indirectly receded from NATO after the Russia‑Ukraine war, perhaps Americans should also step back from front‑stage control of European clubs. In reality, Chelsea’s major investments—from player transfers to sponsorship—are largely driven by Middle Eastern funds.
從紐卡素的半場潰敗到禿頭教練的更迭：車路士的聖誕噩夢
就在馬列斯卡發佈過往48小時沒有受到球會支持的言論後，很快傳出曼城教練離任後他將是接任人選，雖説稍後各方面都予以否認，但恰巧在馬列斯卡剛換了經紀人公司之後，明顯是背後有人操作。然後車路士客場對陣紐卡素，半場藍軍潰不成軍連輸2球，下半場才勉強扳平比分。雖然半場後車路士有取勝的希望，但無奈上半場輕易落後，安素費南迪斯沒有上場，中場硬度和銜接不夠，藍軍防守中堅頻頻失誤，科芬拿復出後水準欠佳，導致中路防守大開，被對方高中鋒輕鬆破門。下半場左路加納草屢次邊路突破，但衆所周知他能突能帶不能傳射，臨門一腳天馬行空難以捉摸，最後浪費大量機會遺憾平局，追平的兩球一是靠隊長的任意球和前鋒帕度的拼搶得分，根本談不上有效的戰術配合。
馬列斯卡無疑是個好教練，但是不是功成名就的頂尖教練，過往沒有任何拿得出手的成績，無非就是名帥助教而已。雖偶有表現拿了世俱杯和歐協杯，但那都是一次性的靈光乍現而已，而且更多是靠高爾彭馬的個人表現。他經常被詬病的是硬性的輪換制度，場上的機械調動和戰前的戰術佈置，甚至連奪冠需要在中下游球隊的比賽中得分，對付強隊盡力保持不敗的基本知識都沒有。每次比賽陣容都有變動，而且很多感覺莫名其妙，正如對陣紐卡素，安素熱身半場苦無機會，中場難於調度下球隊幾乎潰不成軍。所謂不受支持是球隊正在招人取代馬列斯卡，基於車路士有頻繁更換教練的經驗，而且本賽季有多支球隊換教練後成績提升，甚至在前6名中有多支中游球隊，因爲教練戰術得當而取得好成績。藍軍聖誕賽季滑坡已經成了保留節目，對陣保級球隊都難有獲勝把握，相反是對強隊稍有表現，如此想奪冠幾乎不可能。
所謂給予足夠時間靜待球隊成長，簡單講2個賽季已經足夠，大球會不可能沒有成績要求。雖然現在換教練可能性不高，但球會其實已經諮詢過水晶宮教練，世界盃後選擇更多，巴西國家對的安察洛蒂，英格蘭國家隊的杜曹，甚至摩連奴都在車路上創造過輝煌，等世界盃賦閑後完全可以考慮。實際上很多頂級教練也想回歸，杜曹經常回來看比賽，摩連奴近期重返斯坦福橋也被狠打了一副感情牌，安察洛蒂當年拿了雙料冠軍。全世界頂級教練也就是那麽幾個，想要取得好成績必須請高水準教練。車路士近年無論從購買球員到聘請教練都問題叢生，只買年輕的不買最好的，只請喜歡的不請最合適的。
美國財團控制球會後一定會發生混亂，這在其他球隊也屢見不鮮，但藍軍如此大投入，操作數年仍顯混亂實在是乏善可陳。特朗普上臺後荒誕治國，美國財團控制藍軍後胡亂操作。既然美國因俄烏戰爭間接退出了北約，美國人在藍軍是否也應該退出歐洲球會前臺。況且車路士實際獲得的投入，從買賣球員到贊助廣告都是中東財團主導。
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