千變萬化的飛俠: 2025

2025年12月23日星期二

白川のぞみＭｏｏｎ＆Ｓｕｎ

Has Uncle Hun Sen’s Backer Fallen? – The International Drama Behind Thailand’s Military Crackdown

Thailand’s military crackdown on Cambodia has been remarkably smooth. The world‑plaguing hubs of telecom fraud, gambling centers, and human organ trafficking institutions have been continuously struck. In recent years, Cambodia’s economic development has relied heavily on the rapid growth of these criminal industries, with the government even making them a focal point of national economic revitalization, supported by neighboring countries. As a tourism hub in Southeast Asia, Thailand has suffered greatly: countless tourists have been scammed, kidnapped, gone missing, or even killed. This has dealt a severe blow to Thailand’s economy and tarnished its international image, ultimately prompting Thailand to decisively employ military means to eradicate Cambodia’s criminal industries and strike hard against Hun Sen’s government.

Given the disparity in military strength between the two countries, Thailand’s operations have faced virtually no resistance. Having already dismantled border crime bases, Thai forces have advanced inland, conducting systematic sweeps. However, a complete eradication of these industries will take time. Unless the Chinese government formally intervenes with strong measures, Thailand’s military campaign is unlikely to stop in the short or medium term. In fact, the masterminds, workers, and victims of Cambodia’s criminal industries are predominantly Chinese, with close ties to China’s elite families. Before launching its operations, Thailand carefully weighed all factors and acted only after securing U.S. support. These criminal industries are despised worldwide—whether in Southeast Asia, China, or overseas—but due to years of protection from a major power, they had remained unchecked.

China’s response has been subtle. Beyond formal calls for a ceasefire, it has offered no tangible assistance to Cambodia. Objectively, if China were to intervene forcefully to protect Cambodia, it would be unable to escape international condemnation for fostering criminal industries. Moreover, revelations show that shareholders of Cambodia’s organ trafficking research centers are Chinese state medical institutions and companies. The SIM cards used in telecom fraud are issued by Chinese telecom firms, and the gambling dens are backed by Chinese financiers. Organ trafficking is considered a crime against humanity, and most victims of other criminal industries are also Chinese. Directly shielding these industries would be indefensible internationally, so Beijing has shifted blame onto Cambodia’s government. Cambodia’s military, though armed by China, is too weak to resist comprehensively. Facing inevitable defeat, China sees little reason to intervene directly, which would invite global criticism. With the U.S. openly involved, Beijing is further constrained, especially after the recent lull in the U.S.–China trade war, where China had gained a slight advantage. Avoiding excessive provocation of Washington is now a priority.

The Indo‑Pacific strategy was originally spearheaded by Abe and Trump. With Abe gone and Trump’s trade war unpopular, India’s defeat in the May air battle against Pakistan (backed by China) shifted the focus from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. This led to enhanced U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Japan’s pledge to defend Taiwan, and Thailand’s military strike against Cambodia (backed by China). The aim is to reshape China’s regional blueprint built through the Belt and Road Initiative. Russia’s Putin has aligned with Trump, while China’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy has left it isolated internationally. The Indo‑Pacific strategy has evolved from “westward offense, eastward defense” before the trade war into “eastward offense, westward defense,” designed to contain China’s expansionist ambitions.

China itself faces severe internal challenges: economic decline, political turmoil, fierce infighting, diplomatic isolation, and public discontent. Military power struggles have intensified, and the leadership’s grip on authority is unstable. Over a decade of carefully crafted projects—from the Belt and Road Initiative to Xiong’an New Area, from the Beijing Stock Exchange to even Chinese football—have largely failed, weakening national strength and global influence. While criminal industries in Cambodia and Myanmar have thrived, they have inflicted heavy damage on Southeast Asia’s economies, ultimately driving Thailand closer to the U.S. and prompting direct action against Cambodia.

Hillary Clinton’s “pivot to Asia” strategy was never clearly defined, as the U.S. never truly withdrew from Asia. ASEAN’s ten nations have long relied on the U.S. politically while leaning toward China economically. The current situation is more complex: the Philippines and Vietnam confront China head‑on, Myanmar and Cambodia are aligned with Beijing, while others remain neutral or hedge both sides. Thailand, historically neutral, has now tilted toward the U.S., a move of great significance. China’s support for its Southeast Asian client states has always relied on exporting benefits, with the rise of criminal industries becoming a by‑product of the Belt and Road. This crackdown severely undermines China’s influence. The criminal parks—telecom fraud centers, organ trafficking institutions, and casinos—are all backed by Chinese elites with ties to the highest leadership. Amid China’s internal turmoil, its ability to respond to this sudden blow is limited.

If Southeast Asian nations collectively align with the U.S., the entire Indo‑Pacific region, possibly including Russia, will form a ring of encirclement against China. Although Russia, with China’s support, has managed to sustain its position in the Ukraine war, prolonged conflict will eventually exhaust Putin. Russia’s ultimate downfall is foreseeable. Once that war ends and the world’s second‑strongest military power is defeated, the day of encircling the third‑strongest power will arrive. Thus, Thailand’s military strike against Cambodia’s criminal industries carries strategic weight: it not only dismantles illicit enterprises and weakens Hun Sen’s government but also reshapes Southeast Asia’s order.

洪森大叔的靠山難道塌了- 泰國軍事清剿背後的國際大戲

泰國對柬埔寨的軍事清剿行動非常順利，為禍世界的電詐園區，賭博中心和人體器官販賣機構等不斷受到打擊。柬埔寨近年經濟發展依賴上述犯罪產業的長足發展，政府也將此發展成振興國家經濟的重點，並且得到了來自鄰國的支持。如此作爲東南亞旅遊中心的泰國深受其害，大量旅遊人口被詐騙，綁架，失蹤和死亡，對經濟打擊很大而且在國際上的形象也在不斷惡化，最終導致泰國果斷出手用軍事手段清除柬埔寨犯罪產業，並且嚴厲打擊洪森政府。

由於兩國軍事實力懸殊，泰國的軍事行動毫無阻礙，目前在打擊了邊境犯罪基地外，已經深入內地逐點圍剿，但整體清除犯罪產業需要一定時間，除非中國政府正式出面嚴厲幹預，否則泰國的軍事行動很難在中短期內停止。事實上柬埔寨犯罪產業的幕後金主，從業人員和被害對象都是中國人，而且和中國高層權貴家族有非常緊密的聯係，泰國的軍事行動執行前，已經預先進行了各方面的考量，並且得到了美國的支持後才採取行動。對於爲害世界的犯罪產業，無論東南亞，中國還是海外都是深惡痛絕，但是由於某大國的庇佑多年來對此毫無辦法。

中國政府對此的反應非常微妙，除了形式上的勸説停火，並沒有對柬埔寨做出實際幫助。客觀上說如果強力幹預保護柬埔寨，在國際上發展犯罪產業的罪名肯定無法逃脫，況且現在柬埔寨爆出的器官販賣研究中心的股東全部都是中國官方的醫學院所和醫療公司。電詐用電話卡都是中國電訊公司發行，賭場的幕後金主也是中國公民。器官產業屬於反人類的範疇，其他犯罪產業的受害者也是中國人爲主。如果直接包庇犯罪產業，在國際上實在交代不過去，所以最後只能諉過柬埔寨政府。況且柬埔寨軍隊本就是中國武裝的，無奈實力有限沒有全面對抗能力，必敗無疑的情況下也沒必要直接介入，引發國際上的指責。還有美國政府背後的直接幹預，投鼠忌器下中國也不敢直接出面，況且還是在中美貿易戰剛剛偃旗息鼓，中方反敗爲勝稍占優勢的前提下，也需要避免過度刺激美國。

美國打造的印太戰略區的始作俑者是安倍和川普，現在前者斯人已去，川普發動的貿易戰不得人心，印度在5月的空戰中完敗中國支持的巴基斯坦，因此打壓中國的重點從印度洋已經轉向太平洋，如此引發對台灣的加強版軍售，日本表態保衛台灣，泰國軍事打壓中國支援的柬埔寨，目的自然是重整中國近年靠一路一帶在東南亞打造的新版圖。俄羅斯普京已經是川普盟友，中國的戰狼外交使其在國際上已被孤立，印太戰略區從貿易戰開打前的西攻東守攻，發展為東攻西守，用以牽制中國的對外擴張野心。現在的重心問題是中國本身的發展局勢，國內經濟凋敝，政治混亂，內鬥激烈，外交孤立，民怨沸騰，特別是軍隊內部鬥爭白熱化，最高領導層權力不穩。十多年來精心打造的所有發展規劃，從一帶一路到雄安新區，從北京交易所甚至到中國足球，幾乎所有項目都功敗垂成。嚴重削弱了國立和對外影響力。雖然在柬埔寨和緬甸打造的犯罪產業成績斐然，但整體上對東南亞的經濟打擊很大，最後發展成泰國倒向美國，對中國支持的柬埔寨直接動手。

希拉蕊當年提出的重返亞太策略其實不明確，美國從來就沒有撤出亞洲。東盟10囯歷來是政治上依靠美國，經濟上偏向中國。現在的發展更趨複雜化，菲律賓，越南與中國針鋒相對，緬甸和柬埔寨是中方勢力，其他國家則要麽置身事外或兩面下注，因此相對中立的泰國，放棄歷來的平衡戰略，本次傾向美國就至關重要了。中國對東南亞附屬國家的扶持從來就是靠利益輸出，犯罪產業的興起是一帶一路的副產物。如果本次清剿對於中方影響力打擊很大。況且犯罪園區內的電詐中心，人體器官販賣機構和各類賭場等，幕後金主和操控者本來就是中國權貴，並且和最高權力階層關係密切，現在內鬥白熱化的情況下，對與突如其來的打壓應對能力有限。

如果東南亞國家集體倒向美國，整個印太戰略區甚至包括俄羅斯將對中國形成包圍。雖然俄羅斯在中國支持下在俄烏戰場還能維持局面，但戰爭持續發展下去普京被消耗殆盡後，俄羅斯的最終結局已經可以預見。只要戰爭結束世界第二軍事強國戰敗之時，就是圍剿第三軍事強國的開戰之日。所以，目前泰國對柬埔寨犯罪產業的軍事打擊行動具有戰略意義，不但能夠清除犯罪產業打擊洪森政府，而且可以重塑東南亞新秩序。